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SECTION 9-108 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: DOES IT INSULATE THE SECURITY
INTEREST FROM ATTACK BY A
TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY!
LAWRENCE P. KING t
It is the thesis of this article that with regard to inventory and
receivables financing, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not afford the protection necessary in the event of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. The problem does not concern the collateral in existence at
the time of the original transaction between creditor and debtor but it
involves collateral acquired subsequently.
Inventory and receivables financing agreements naturally will in-
clude stipulations providing for the inclusion of new inventory or
receivables. under the security agreement. In the case where such
new collateral is acquired within four months prior to the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy, will the security interest in the new collateral
be subject to avoidance by the trustee in bankruptcy? This article
concludes that it can be defeated by the trustee although the UCC did
not intend this result.
Basically, this result can be traced to the language of the UCC;
the remedy may, appropriately, be there as well. In the UCC, only
four sections are particularly relevant to this result: sections 9-301,
9-303, 9-204 and 9-108. These must be read in light of sections 60(a)
and 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act'
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Voidable Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act
Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act sets forth the following
elements necessary to constitute a transfer preferential:
(1) a transfer of the debtor's property to a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt;
(3) within four months prior to the bankruptcy petition;
(4) when the debtor is insolvent; and
(5) the effect of which is to give the creditor a greater percentage
of his debt than other creditors in the same class would receive.
Section 60(b) adds a further element necessary to make the
preference voidable:
(6) that at the time of the transfer the creditor receiving it had
reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent.
Our concern will be with elements (2), (3), (4) and (6). Ele-
ments (1) and (5) present no difficulty since, by definition, a transfer
certainly includes the creation of a security interest' under the UCC
and element (5) will be present in all cases where the others exist.3
The one factor common to elements (2), (3), (4) and (6) is
the time factor. Without knowing the specific day on which the
transfer occurred, it is impossible to determine whether the transfer
was within the four-month period, whether it was for an antecedent
debt, whether the debtor was insolvent and whether the creditor knew
the debtor was insolvent. For the purposes of this article the dis-
cussion will be limited further by excluding elements (4) and (6)
since insolvency and knowledge of it are strictly factual issues. It may
be assumed that those elements exist on the key dates under dis-
cussion. In passing, it should be pointed out, however, that all
elements in sections 60(a) and 60(b) must coexist in order for the
transfer to be voidable; if any one is lacking, the trustee may not
avoid the transfer as a preference."
Thus, it is essential to know when a transfer has taken place.
Section 60(a) provides a means for making this determination by
2 The Bankruptcy Act defines "transfer" to include every mode of parting with
an interest in property including the fixing of a lien on it. 30 Stat 545 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1964).
8 See generally 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.34, 60.35 (14th ed. 1964).
4 Id. ff 60.02.
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establishing a test: transfers of personal property are considered to
have taken place when they become perfected against judicial lien
creditors. The Bankruptcy Act does not define the rights of a lien
creditor vis-A-vis a transferee of a debtor's property; that definition is
left to state law. In essence the trustee in bankruptcy is given, by
section 60(a), the status of a judicial lien creditor. What rights he
attains from that status are determined by state law, not the Bank-
ruptcy Act; therefore, in speaking about security interests, it is neces-
sary to refer to state law to learn when they become perfected against
judicial lien creditors. That date will determine the existence of the
elements of a voidable preference.6 In this connection it is also of
some importance to note that the Bankruptcy Act uses the word
"perfected." The transfer is deemed to have been made when it
"became so far perfected" that no subsequent judicial lienholder could
have avoided it.7  The next reference, then, must be to the applicable
state law, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
UCC Section 9-301
The key section in article 9 providing for the order of priorities
affecting lien creditors is section 9-301 (1) (b). That section reads:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is per-
fected ....
A lien creditor is defined in section 9-301(3) as "a creditor who
has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or
the like . . . . " It also includes a trustee in bankruptcy but this
inclusion does not affect the present discussion since this status is
given the trustee by section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
5 Section 60(a) (2) states:
For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer of
property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien
upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple
contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee.
52 Stat. 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §96(a)(2) (1964). Section 60(a)(7),
64 Stat 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (7) (1964), also referring to the date of per-
fection, is not relevant here, although it raises another problem of conflict with the
UCC. But that is another story.
6 See 3 CoLum, op. cit. supra note 3, 1 60.39.
752 Stat 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1964).
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Thus, section 9-301 makes unperfected security interests sub-
ordinate to judicial lien creditors. The lien creditor to have priority
must obtain his lien before the security interest is perfected and without
actual knowledge of it.'
We have so far moved from section 60 to section 9-301; we have
determined that a transfer takes place when a lien creditor cannot
acquire superior rights in the property and that a lien creditor can
acquire rights superior to an unperfected security interest. Section
9-301 does not provide when or how a security interest is perfected.
For these answers we must turn elsewhere.
UCC Section 9-303
Section 9-303 specifies, in general, when a security interest is
perfected, but it does not detail how it is perfected. It provides:
(1) A security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have
been taken. Such steps are specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304,
9-305 and 9-306. If such steps are taken before the security
interest attaches, it is perfected at the time when it attaches.
Two matters are worthy of note. First, this section uses the word
"perfected." This is clearly a reference to the concept of perfection
incorporated in section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the word
apparently was chosen to conform article 9 with this part of the
Bankruptcy Act.'
Second, two steps are required for full perfection. First, the
security interest must attach; second, the applicable steps for perfection
as required by other sections must be taken. Normally these steps
will be by way of filing a financing statement or by the secured party's
obtaining possession of the collateral.1" Thus, for the quality of per-
fection envisioned by section 9-301, to protect against intervening lien
creditors, section 9-303 dearly requires that both stages be met. The
step that occurs later determines the date on which the security interest
achieves full perfection.
8 The "unless as otherwise provided" lead-off language has no relevance to this
discussion because that refers to purchase money security interests. This article will
not deal with interests of that type but only with the after-acquired property clause
in the original security agreement.
9 See 2 GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS iN PERSONAL PROPERTY 435 (1965).
10 The applicable steps, under the Code, may include filing, UNIFORM ComimcrAL
CODE §9-302, obtaining possession, UNiFoRM COMMERCiAL CODE §§9-305, 9-304(1),
or nothing at all except attachment. E.g., UNiFORM CoMMERc Al CODE § 9-302(1) (d).
Except for § 9-305, which deals with a pledge-like transaction, the proper step for
perfection will depend upon the nature of the collateral, e.g., inventory, consumer
goods, instruments.
UCC SECTION 9-108
For our illustration, we assume a case of inventory or receivables
financing; therefore, the applicable step for perfection would be that
governed by section 9-302, i.e., the filing of a financing statement.
Such filing would constitute compliance with one requirement of
section 9-303. However, in order to determine whether the other
requirement has been complied with-whether the secured interest has
attached-it is necessary to look beyond the terms of section 9-303.
For this information we must turn to section 9-204.
UCC Section 9-204
As stated in Official Comment 1 to section 9-204: "Subsection
(1) states three basic prerequisites to the existence of a security in-
terest: agreement, value, and collateral. When these three coexist a
security interest may, in the terminology adopted in this Article,
attach." The "terminology adopted in this Article" is of particular
significance. That terminology, as we have just seen, is used in
section 9-303 to specify when a security interest is perfected; if not
perfected it is subordinated to lien creditors; the possibility of a void-
able preference then arises. It is, therefore, of singular importance to
determine when a security attaches, and this is the heart of the problem
under discussion.
Section 9-204 lists three elements needed for a security interest
to attach. There must be an agreement that it attach, value must be
given and the debtor must have rights in the collateral. Ordinarily
the first two elements will occur simultaneously or substantially so
(with the possible exception of future advances), but the third may
occur at a later date. To make our hypothetical situation concrete, we
may assume a loan against inventory presently owned and any to be
acquired subsequently for 100,000 dollars. S, the secured creditor, and
D, the debtor, execute a security agreement on February 15, the
loan is made on that date and S properly files a financing statement on
the same date. Also, on that date, D has in stock inventory valued
at 125,000 dollars. With regard to this inventory, no problem exists.
There was agreement (by virtue of the security agreement), value was
given (100,000 dollar loan) and the debtor has rights in the collateral
(he owns the presently existing inventory). Thus the security interest
attached to the inventory, filing was accomplished and the security in-
terest is fully perfected. Should D file in bankruptcy at any time
thereafter, the security interest would not be subject to avoidance by
the trustee. The transfer (security interest) will be deemed made on
February 15, which even if within four months of bankruptcy, would
19661
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not be voidable because it was made for a contemporaneous considera-
tion (100,000 dollar loan), not for an antecedent debt."
Since inventory is a fluctuating commodity, the agreement between
S and D will contain an after-acquired property clause. If the original
collateral consisted of accounts receivable instead of inventory, the
same would be true. In any event, D orders 50,000 dollars worth
of goods on open account from W on June 1, the order is accepted by
W on June 2, the goods are processed for shipment on June 10, they
are delivered to a carrier on June 15 and delivered to D on June 30.
A question could be raised at this point regarding the ratio of the new
goods to the pre-existent inventory on February 15--i.e., by June 30
did D now have 175,000 dollars worth of inventory, the same 125,000
dollars worth or less than 125,000 dollars? Because we will assume
that D filed a petition in bankruptcy on August 1, it is highly unlikely
that his inventory would increase in amount. As the following dis-
cussion indicates, however, it should make no difference whether the
overall stock is maintained in value or decreases in value, as would be
likely. For purposes of argument, we will assume that beginning late
in May, D was insolvent and S was aware of this fact.
During the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding the trustee investigates
the S-D relationship and concludes that he cannot reach any of the
original inventory which still remains in the stock of D. On the other
hand, in testing out the secured interest on the subsequently acquired
inventory a question is raised in his mind. When was the security
interest perfected? Working his way through sections 9-303 and
9-204 he notes that the financing statement was filed on February 15,
more than four months before bankruptcy. The agreement was made
and value was given also on February 15, but when did the debtor
obtain rights in the collateral?
To repeat, the Code states clearly that the security interest must
attach, even though there has been filing, in order for it to be per-
fected. The security interest cannot attach until the debtor obtains
rights in the collateral.
Although in our hypothetical there may be some uncertainty
about the exact date on which D obtains rights in the subsequently
acquired inventory, 12 it is apparent that the earliest date would be
"1 No question can arise under either § 70(c) or § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act
since prior to bankruptcy the security interest was perfected and there could be no
creditor with a provable claim by whom the transfer was voidable. 30 Stat. 566
(1896), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(c), (e) (1964).
12 As one of the requisites for a security interest to attach, the debtor must have
rights in the collateral. UNrsoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204. It is curious that the
Code, both in article 1 and article 9, contains no definition of "rights in the collateral."
No help is given by the Code to determine when such rights are acquired or what
test is to be used to determine that date. The language of this requisite in § 9-204
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June 1 and the latest June 30. Both dates are within the key four-
month period prior to bankruptcy. For purposes of argument, the
assumption is made that the actual date is June 10. Very clearly, the
Code then provides that the transfer is made on June 10. That is
the date on which the security interest attaches (section 9-204), it is the
date on which it is perfected (section 9-303) and thus it is the date
beyond which no lien creditor could obtain priority over the secured
creditor (section 9-301).' Since June 10 is the date on which the
transfer is deemed to have been made, the elements of a voidable
preference must exist, if at all, on that date. It will be seen that
all exist.
On June 10, D was insolvent and S knew D was insolvent (by
hypothesis). June 10 is within four months prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. These facts are clear and present no difficulty.
The key element is whether or not the transfer was for an antecedent
debt. Factually the answer is simple. At the time the transfer is
deemed to have been made, June 10, no advance was made by S, no
value was given and the inventory fell under the after-acquired property
clause of the security agreement as additional security for the 100,000
dollar loan made on February 15. The transfer was for an antecedent
debt. Analogies have been made to flowing rivers, both the Mississippi
and the Rio Grande, 4 to show that inventory is really one mass like a
river with the components making up the mass changing with each
new minute and each new day. Such arguments are quite poetic but
what is not explained is how they are applicable to overcome a statutory
ambiguity where none exists.
is similar to no other language in the Code. Where the debtor purchases the property
which will serve as collateral, there are several possible times when he acquires
rights in it: when the purchase contract is entered into, when the goods are identified
to the purchase contract, when title to the goods passes to the buyer-debtor, when
shipment commences or when delivery is effected. At least one court has suggested
that mere possession of goods is not sufficient to invest the debtor with rights in the
collateral. Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441
(Super. Ct. 1964).
It appears that the debtor acquires rights in the collateral when, under a purchase
contract, the goods are identified. Cf. UNIFORMX COMMERCrA. CODE § 2-501. Section
2-501 provides that upon identification, the buyer acquires a special property in the
goods, which although also undefined, is not a security interest, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-201(37), but does give the buyer certain rights. See, e.g., UNIFORM Com-
mERcrAL CODE §2-502. On the other hand, it could be argued that the key date
should be that when title passes under § 2-401 because no section in article 2 specifically
refers to the issue of whe; rights in collateral are obtained. See, for further dis-
cussion, 1 GmmoRE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 353; Hogan, Future Goods, Floating
Liens, and Foolish Creditors, in 2 COoAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SEcURFD TRANsAcrioNs
UNDER THE UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE, ch. 18B (1966).
13 For a possible argument to the contrary, see the discussion in the text at
note 49 infra.
14 See Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniforin Commercial Code, 65 CoLum. L.
Rxv. 232, 233-34 (1965).
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Article 9 is not ambiguous on the point under discussion. It
explicitly states that a security interest cannot attach until the debtor
obtains rights in the collateral. 5  He cannot obtain such rights at least
until he has contracted for the purchase of the property involved and
perhaps even at some later date." The security interest cannot be
perfected until it has attached." This is clear statutory directive.
What room is left for interpretation or supplying intent? The clarity
of the language and the obvious conclusion were well known to the
Code's draftsmen. It was certainly understood that utilization of the
concept of "attaching" tied in with perfection clearly could create a
voidable preference situation when the security agreement covered
after-acquired property.s It was so clearly recognized that the secu-
rity interest in attaching on the after-acquired property would be for
an antecedent debt that section 9-108 was worded to prevent this par-
ticular result. As mentioned, the draftsmen of article 9 knew they were
creating a preference case; but, they certainly did not intend there to
be a preference voidable under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. To
obviate the natural consequences flowing from sections 9-303 and
9-204, they proposed a definition of "antecedent debt" in section 9-108
which would deem the type of transfer under discussion to have been
taken for new value.
UCC Section 9-108
For the purpose of application in insolvency proceedings, including
bankruptcy, section 9-108 fits in with and must be read with section
9-204. Section 9-108 provides:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an
obligation, releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise
gives new value which is to be secured in whole or in part
by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value
and not as security for an antecedent debt if the debtor
acquires his rights in such collateral either in the ordinary
course of his business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time
after new value is given.
With reference to the present discussion, this section provides
simply that the security interest in the new inventory acquired in
15 U o M COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).
16 See generally Hogan, supra note 12.
1 7 UNIORM CommERciA.L CODE § 9-303(1).
I8 See UrnoM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 9-108, CoMent 1; 1 COOGAN, HoGAN &
VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 12, chs. 10, 11; 2 GILMoRE, op. ci. supra note 9, § 45.6.
UCC SECTION 9-108
June is deemed taken for new value and not for an antecedent debt.
This is so because S extended the loan on February 15 (gave new
value), which was to be secured in part by after-acquired property,
and D obtained the new inventory in the ordinary course of his
business.
As far as state law is concerned, section 9-108 would fictionalize
that the transfer (secured interest attaching to the new inventory) was
made for new value. This the Code may certainly do by way of
definition. For example, insolvency proceedings in New York would
fall under the Debtor and Creditor Law, section 15 (6-a) of which is a
condensed copy of sections 60(a) and 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. 9
In a proceeding under the state law, the Code's definition of antecedent
debt, or new value, would control and, where applicable, the transfer
would not be voidable as a preference. In its relationship to the
Bankruptcy Act, however, the result is not so clear.
As mentioned at the outset, sections 60(a) and 60(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act set forth the elements of a voidable preference. Some
of these elements require definition and some definitions are found in
the Act itself. "Transfer," 20 "insolvency," 21 "creditor" ' and "peti-
tion" 2 are examples of words specifically defined. One element is
clearly related to state law, i.e., the rights of a judicial lien
creditor to avoid or upset transfers. The words "antecedent
debt" are neither specifically defined in the act nor are they referred
to as defined by state law. No reference is made back to state law for
the meaning to be given them. Thus, the question is whether state
law, section 9-108 of the UCC, may properly and effectively give
meaning to antecedent debt, for use in connection with the federal
10 N.Y. DEOR AND CREDIToR LAW § 15 (6-a) (1965) provides:
The court shall have power:
6-a. To authorize an assignee to bring an action, which he is hereby
empowered to maintain, against any person, who with reasonable cause to
believe the assignor was insolvent . . . has within four months of the assign-
ment received a voluntary transfer from the assignor of money or property
for or on account of an antecedent debt, the effect of which transfer is to
enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class, and the assignee may recover the property so
transferred or its value. For the purpose of this section a transfer shall be
deemed to have been made when it is so far perfected that no creditor having
a judgment on a simple contract without special priority (whether or not such
a creditor exists) could have obtained an interest superior to that of the
transferee therein. A transfer not so perfected prior to the assignment shall
be deemed to have been made immediately before the assignment.
2030 Stat. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §1(30) (1964).
2130 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964).
2230 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(11) (1964).
2830 Stat. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C §1(24) (1964).
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statute, section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. The Official Comment
to section 9-108 answers the question very neatly:
The section makes explicit what has been true under the
case law: an after-acquired property interest is not, by virtue
of that fact alone, security for a pre-existing claim. This rule
is of importance principally in insolvency proceedings under
the federal Bankruptcy Act or state statutes which make
certain transfers for antecedent debt voidable as preferences.
The determination of when a transfer is for. antecedent debt
is left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law.
This Comment proves too much. In the first sentence quoted,
regarding prior case law on whether the transfer is for an antecedent
debt, it is not indicated that the prior law did not involve the concept
and rule of the UCC of a security interest attaching. It is the Code
itself that creates something new in this regard. The need for the
security interest to attach postpones the perfection date instead of
permitting it to relate back to the time when value was actually
given." If this part of the Comment is speaking of policy, as does an
earlier sentence which states that the transfer should not be considered
for an antecedent debt, then one must look to the text of the statute
to determine whether the policy has been carried out. Section 9-108
purports to comply with this policy but no help is given in determining
whether it effectively does so.
The second sentence quoted indicates that section 9-108 was
drafted with section 60 clearly in mind. The last sentence is the
stumbling block. "The determination of when a transfer is for
antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law." No
citation of authority is offered for this statement; no reference of any
kind is made to any source for an explanation of it. Whence did
it originate?
Professor Gilmore, one of article 9's draftsmen, says of section
9-108:
This provision is of course designed to provide a rule
of state law which will be effective in bankruptcy proceedings
to preserve such after-acquired property interests from invali-
dation as voidable preferences. Lawyers whose opinion is
entitled to respect have expressed doubts that the provision
will be effective, feeling that the federal bankruptcy courts
will decide the question of transfer for antecedent debt as a
matter of federal and not state law ......
24UNIFORM ComMmcIAL CODE §§9-204, 9-303(1).
251 GumoR, op. cit. supra note 9, at 362.
UCC SECTION 9-108
It may be noted at this point that Professor Gilmore does not, in his
treatise, refer to the Official Comment' or offer any explanation for
the statement that the Bankruptcy Act leaves to state law the deter-
mination of when a transfer is for an antecedent debt. Moreover, no
explanation can be found in Coogan, Eogan and Vagts,26 although
both treatises discuss the basic conflict involved in much detail, based
on arguments of policy."
Collier on Bankruptcy expresses a position opposite to Gilmore's.2 s
It sets forth the proposition that only the determination of when a
transfer is perfected is left to state law.
The idea of supremacy of state law is confined to the
field just discussed, i.e., what constitutes perfection of a
transfer. This matter determined, the question of whether
the transfer is preferential is settled by the general framework
of § 60a, and its voidability by § 60b. . . . What consti-
tutes the general framework of § 60 is a federal question,
whether presented in a state or federal court, upon which the
United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter.29
As far as the UCC is concerned, it determines the date of per-
fection by reference to the applicable steps required and to the time
when a security interest attaches. This is as far as the Code is
permitted to go. Section 9-108 does not deal with the time or method
of perfection. It seeks to offer a definition of antecedent debt-a
definition that is distinctly contrary to that used by the courts in
applying section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. No case is cited to
substantiate the assertion in the Official Comment that state law deter-
mines when a transfer is for an antecedent debt. On the other hand,
no pre-Code case can be cited which holds directly that such deter-
mination must be a matter of federal law." The whole wording and
policy of section 60(a), however, certainly lead to this conclusion.
The basic reason is that section 60(a) leaves to state law the deter-
mination of only one aspect of a preferential transfer, i.e., the date on
which the transfer is made. Once that question is resolved, section
60(a) requires the determination whether the transfer was for an
antecedent debt or for a contemporaneous consideration. Was there a
quid pro quo on that date leaving the debtor's estate substantially
26 CooOA-, HoGANr & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 12.
2 See 1 CoOGAN, HoGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. mipra note 12, chs. 10, 11, 13; 1 Gi.-
moa op. cit. supra note 9, § 11.7, 2 id. §§ 45.6, 45.7.
283 CoLLmm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 760 n.26, 960.
291d. at 960.
3o For cases construing the antecedent debt feature of a voidable preference, see
3 CoLunm, op. cit. supra note 3, 1 60.19, 60.39[4].
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in the same condition it was in prior to the transfer? Antecedent debt
has been given its usual and ordinary meaning through the years by
all courts deciding this issue in preference cases.-1 For state law to
come along and offer a meaning wholly abnormal to the term certainly
appears to be contrary to the purposes of section 60(a) and express
congressional intent. Had Congress not meant for antecedent debt to
have its clear meaning, one would suppose the Bankruptcy Act would
contain a definition or would expressly require reference to state law
for definition.
One post-UCC opinion has been referred to as making section
9-108 effectual in bankruptcy proceedings.' This is an opinion by
Referee Hiller in In re Newkirk Mining Co.' The reference is not
well founded. Newkirk arose on a reclamation petition filed by a
secured creditor which was opposed by the trustee in bankruptcy. The
security agreement contained an after-acquired property clause and
some of the property sought to be reclaimed was after-acquired. Sig-
nificantly, no dates are mentioned in the opinion. When was the
bankruptcy petition filed? When was the after-acquired property
obtained? The court states merely that section 9-204(3) permits a
security agreement to include after-acquired property. It then
continues:
In an attempt to avoid, to some extent at least, a clash with
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, Article 9-108(2) provides
that the security interest in after-acquired property is to be
deemed as having taken "for value," and not as security for
a pre-existing debt, so as to constitute a possible preference
under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. 4
Nothing further is said with regard to section 9-108. The language
quoted is merely descriptive of the section and no indication, expressly
or inferentially, is given regarding the effectiveness of section 9-108.
This case, then, cannot be said to hold in favor of section 9-108; at
most, it is mere dictum. In a later decision Referee Snedecor says
that Referee Hiller's statement is dictum and that the after-acquired
equipment was obtained by the bankrupt sometime before section 60's
four-month period. 5  In this later decision there is, in fact, a direct
holding that the federal law is supreme over the state law, that section
31 Ibid.
32See WmniE & HART, UNIFoRm CoamtcrAL CODE REPoRTER-DIGEST 2-983
(1965).
33 54 Berks Co. L.J. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
3 4 Id. at 180-181.
35 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 CCH BANKR. L. REP. ff 61,722
(D. Ore. 1966).
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9-108 does not have any validity in determining what is an antecedent
debt for purposes of section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.3
In this case, In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,37 the
security agreement covering accounts receivable "now existing or
hereafter arising" " was executed on November 22, 1963, and the
financing statement was filed on November 26, 1963. Substantially
all of the accounts on which a security interest was claimed came into
existence after November 26 and within four months of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition. Referee Snedecor met the issue head-on,
progressing from section 9-204 as to when the security interest attached
to section 9-108 purporting to declare the transfer for new value.
After reviewing the text material available and noting that no cases
had as yet resolved the conflict, he held in favor of the Bankruptcy
Act's supremacy.
Cause and Effect
The proponents of the UCC provisions emphasize two points to
substantiate the section 9-108 proposal. As the Official Comment indi-
cates, pre-Code decisions did not consider after-acquired property
clauses. as involving transfers for antecedent debts. 9 This may well
be, but by the same token pre-Code law did not in so many words
postpone the time of perfection on after-acquired property to the date
on which the debtor acquired "rights in the collateral." 4 The concept
of "attachment" incorporated into the Code is something born with
the Code. Before it came into being, courts did not have to apply
express statutory provisions similar to sections 9-303 and 9-204 to
the mortgages in question. Although it may be perfectly sound in
general to state that the Code is based on prior law and practice, that
the Code's provisions reflect the experience and background through
the years of development with the basic security law and that such
experience and background should be used in interpreting and con-
struing the Code,4 the starting point for construction must be with
the Code itself. If its provisions on any particular issue are clear and,
36 Id. at 71,143-44.
37 2 CCH 3ANR. L. REP'. 61,722 (D. Ore .1966). This decision is before the
district court for review and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has been granted permission to file a brief amicus curiae. 4 CCH Ix-
STALLMENT Cpamrr GumD, Rep. Letter No. 123, at 4 (July 19, 1966).
38Id. at 71,136.
39 See also 2 GnxolE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 45.6; Henson, Supra note 14. Mr.
Henson states that § 9-108 is only a "statutory recognition of what has been accepted
by bankruptcy courts in appropriate cases in times past . . . ." Id. at 236 n.21.
The only answer is, so what? The courts, in times past, did not have to contend
with statutory language now found in §§9-303(1). and 9-204(1).
4 0 UiFORm CommmciAL CoDn § 9-204(1).
41 See 1 Gnmoar. op. cit. supra note 9,-at vii-viii.
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in particular, novel in some respect, then what was may not necessarily
equal what is. Section 9-303 states when a security interest is per-
fected; section 9-204 postpones the date of perfection; but section 60 (a)
refers to state law only for a determination of the date of perfection.
The conflict between section 9-108 and section 60(a) then arises, and
regardless of earlier law or policy reasons, a state's definition of
antecedent debt or any other element of a voidable preference, par-
ticularly an out of the ordinary definition, should have no bearing.'
The second basic argument offered to uphold section 9-108 is the
substitution theory.' The newly acquired inventory or accounts are
mere substitutions for the earlier existing inventory or accounts to
which the security interest attached and was therefore perfected beyond
the critical four-month period. In other words, on February 15 D
had 125,000 dollars worth of inventory; on June 15 he had 125,000
dollars worth of inventory, all of which, though newly acquired, may
be considered a substitution of the original inventory. The secured
interest is not enhanced; the debtor's assets are to no greater extent
being withheld from general creditors, and the secured creditor gets
only what he bargained for when he made the advance to the debtor.
This argument is sound. It makes sense. But it is irrelevant. It
would be relevant and should be a definite policy consideration only
if sections 9-303. and 9-204 were not in the Code.
Section 9-204 grants explicit permission for the use of after-
acquired property to secure loans; ' but just as explicitly it postpones
attachment of the security interest until the debtor acquires rights in
the collateral ' or until accounts come into existence.4" Section 9-303
42 It is argued that "section 9-108 is not an effort by a state statute to legislate
a new definition for the benefit of bankruptcy proceedings; if it were, it certainly
would not be given any effect in bankruptcy." Henson, supra note 14, at 236 n.21.
However, as the Official Comment itself indicates, the section is certainly for the
benefit of bankruptcy proceedings. When § 9-108 purports to give a meaning to
"new value" by providing that what is an antecedent debt is deemed not an ante-
cedent debt, how far away from definition can this be? Again, however, the entire
problem stems not from § 9-108 as such; it derives from the postponement effects
of § 9-303(1) and § 9-204(1), which do not appear to have had any counterpart in
pre-Code law.
43 See In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 CCH BANKR. L. REP. f 61,722
(D. Ore. 1966) ; Henson, supra note 14. Ordinarily, a substitution of collateral does
not create a preference, but the substitution and release of collateral must be simul-
taneous. 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 3, If 60.21. But if new accounts are assigned
for old collected accounts within the four-month period, a preference is created. Ibid.
In the problem under discussion, there is no contemporaneous substitution because the
old accounts were presumably collected or the old inventory sold in the regular course
of business. The Code does not require the debtor to account for the proceeds, UNi-
FORM COmMERCLAL CODE § 9-205, but this flexibility does not affect the § 60 voidable
preference problem. See also 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 12, ch. 11.
44 "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) a security agreement may
provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the
security agreement." UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(3).
45UxNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).4 6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(2) (b).
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says there can be no perfection until the security interest attaches. In
view of the clear statutory mandate, how can considerations of policy
be relevant? How can one avoid this language by offering a sub-
stitution of collateral theory? As Referee Snedecor so neatly put it:
"We must remember that we are dealing with a new statute which
must be accepted on its own terms . . . . , If there were ambiguity
in the terms of the statute, if there were silence on one of these points,
there would be room for interpolation of ideas, for construction and
for giving full effect to the Code's intent. No such room is offered.
The Code itself set the rules of the game and the courts must play
the game according to those rules.
Proposals
The fault, if one can use that term, for creating the conflict is in
the UCC and not in the Bankruptcy Act. There is no question that
the draftsmen of the UCC were well aware of the elements of a void-
able preference when article 9 was being written. Why they chose
to use the language they did is an open question. Why, in drafting
article 9, they chose deliberately to create this conflict is a puzzling
question.
Professor Gilmore, one of the draftsmen, states: "It is unfortunate
that the draftsmen did not hit on a more neutral way of expressing
an idea which, although it is surely one on which reasonable men can
differ, is neither shocking nor ludicrous." 4s It may be neither shock-
ing nor ludicrous but it is puzzling. The language he refers to is the
section 9-108 language; this language is immaterial. What is material
is the tie-in between sections 9-303 and 9-204. Without its cross-
reference or without the postponement of the time of attaching, there
would be no section 60 conflict and no antecedent debt problem. What
is shocking is that this conflict was deliberately created.
What solutions are possible? One possibility is that the problem
will be solved by the United States Supreme Court. But much time
will pass before the Supreme Court acts. During this time, courts,
lawyers and secured lenders will be enveloped by a good deal of
uncertainty. This solution is not a very helpful one, obviously.
Another possibility is statutory amendment. Either the Code
or the Bankruptcy Act could be changed to resolve the conflict. Be-
cause of the complexity of both statutes, however, an amendment
cannot be hurried. Perhaps the Bankruptcy Act could define "ante-
cedent" debt in section 1 to conform to the Code's definition in section
47 1n re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 2 CCH BAN1R. L. RE. 61,722,
at 71,141 (D. Ore. 1966). See note 43 supra.
48 2 GiLmoaz, op. cil. supra note 9, at 1309-10.
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9-108. The difficulty would be that since section 9-108 is not the
only part of the Code that presents section 60 problems, it may be
necessary to tackle section 60 (a) as a whole. Amending section 9-204
or 9-303 of the Code is possible. But rewording section 9-108 would
not be enough. It should be recognized that the federal law defines the
elements of a voidable preference." Since section 60 (a) refers to state
law for perfection, the perfection sections of the Code should be the
source for change.
For example, what is the need for section 9-204(1) in the first
place? The idea of when a security interest "attaches" does not seem
to have much utility, although it does make explicit that there must
be an obligation and agreement. Why not delete the reference to the
debtor's rights in the collateral? Why could not perfection (incor-
porating sections 9-303 and 9-204) depend on the existence of a secu-
rity agreement, an obligation (value) and filing (or whatever other
steps for perfection are required)? It even seems possible to untie
section 9-204 from section 9-303 and not to require attachment for
perfection. Section 9-204 could stand alone, coming into play only in
cases of priority conflict under section 9-312(5) (b). The underlying
basis for these thoughts is that the security interest in after-acquired
property could be considered perfected at the time the financing trans-
action and filing occur without any need to wait for the debtor to
acquire the property. There would then be no problem with the section
60(a) four-month period or antecedent debt element.
A Last Alternative
It has been noted that section 60 refers to state law for the time
of perfection of a security interest. The Bankruptcy Act sets up a
judicial lien creditor test.50 When the transfer is so far perfected
that no judicial lien creditor could have obtained rights in the property
superior to those of the transferee, the transfer is deemed made. The
foregoing analysis emphasized the point that the UCC postpones per-
fection as such, in after-acquired property, to the date when the debtor
acquires rights in the collateral. But this is merely a postponement
of when the security interest is perfected. The mere fact that per-
fection is postponed does not necessarily mean that a judicial lien
creditor could intervene and obtain priority. If reference is made back
to the hypothetical, this thought can be spelled out more clearly.
After February and before June, say on March 15, C, who had
obtained a judgment against D, acquires a lien by delivery of a writ
4930 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964).
50 See note 5 mepra.
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of execution to the proper enforcement officer. Clearly on March 15
C's lien does not encompass D's June inventory; it is not in existence.
When D acquires the June inventory, S's secured interest automatically
attaches without any further act by S. There is no way in which C
could defeat S's secured interest. In supposing this type of problem,
Professor Gilmore takes the position that the lien creditor would lose
to the secured creditor. 1 Assuming this to be the case, the analysis
boils down to the situation where the transfer occurs in June but no
intervening lien creditors could have obtained superior rights in the
collateral at any time; not between February and June and not after
June. Thus June is not the key date to determine the time of the
transfer. As far as after-acquired inventory is concerned, the rights
of lien creditors are to be tested in February, when the security agree-
ment was entered into, value was given and filing occurred. This was
beyond the four-month period, and contemporaneous consideration
passed. It is not sufficient, therefore, to look solely to the time of
the transfer, i.e., attachment under section 9-204; it is necessary to
look also to section 9-301 (1) (b) which gives rights to lien creditors.
Even though attachment is postponed, lien creditors' rights have ceased
to exist even before attachment; the transfer should be deemed made
without reference to the time the debtor obtains rights in the collateral.
This argument rests on the assumption that the security interest
attaches automatically and before the judgment lien does. In fact,
both attach simultaneously, so the answer is not that clear. Both
Professor Gilmore and Mr. Coogan see problems in the area of in-
tangibles financing on this very issue and they conclude that neither
the Code nor the non-Code state law provides the priority answer.,2
The argument, therefore, is offered on this "if" basis only, and the
particular language of non-Code procedural law affecting the judg-
ment creditor's rights must be consulted in each state.
Conclusion
What article 9 seeks to accomplish is clear. That inventory and
receivables financing require for full practical effectiveness the per-
missive use of the after-acquired property features of the Code is also
clear. The present method of accomplishing the stated purpose, how-
ever, defeats that purpose. Relief is needed and soon. Not even the last
offered solution is free from doubt and it should not be required.
Amendatory legislation is a sensible answer; in the meantime the
financing world will have to take chances.
512 Gmmom_ op. cit. supra note 9, § 35.6, at 936.
52 2 CooGAx, HoGA2N & VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 21.01-21.04; 1 Gnmoa ,
op. cit. supra note 9, at 398.
